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
A SECOND

L E T T E R

CONCERNING THE

PROPOSED SUPERVISORSHIP.

*also Dabrymple (A)*



L O N D O N :

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THE O. D. B.

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TO THE  
P R O P R I E T O R S  
O F  
I N D I A - S T O C K .

**T**HE question to be determined by ballot on Wednesday next, is of such importance to the Company, and to this kingdom, that I think it is a duty every man owes to the community, to give all the lights in his power. I am sorry so many respectable members of the Company, who disapprove of the measure, should keep back, and not declare their disapprobation openly to the public: when a house is on fire, it is not enough for any man to wish *another* may carry water to extinguish it. However respectable such men may be from their abilities, from the high and important trusts they have filled, from knowledge of the Company's affairs, and from their *intentions*; I confess they appear to me more culpable for not openly declaring their sentiments, than the men who from ignorance and self-sufficiency pursue measures which may be ruinous to the Company.

In my former Letter, to the Court of Directors, I gave a very candid answer to all the arguments I had heard urged in behalf of the Supervisanship.

The advices from India since received, are indeed, on some points, a better reply than any thing which it was possible for me, or any man to have said, as *facts* surpass all conjectures. I shall therefore lay before the Public an authentic account of the proceedings of the deputation from the government of Bengal to Sujah Dowla.

When Lord Clive *settled* the affairs of Bengal, Sujah Dowla was left in possession of Owde, without any limitation or restriction, in regard to the number, or nature of the troops he might keep up. This left the Company's government in a very critical and dangerous situation; for the general opinion in England being, that the Company's servants abroad are *inclined* to *wars* and *revolutions*; it was obvious that any measures which might appear necessary to guard against an increasing power, would be imputed as an intention to embroil the Company. At the same time, as Sujah Dowla was under no limitation, with what propriety could the government of Bengal, without any act of hostility or offence committed by him, insist that they should impose a *bitter cup* upon him? The argument of self-preservation was the only one which could be alleged, and it was liable to many exceptions; for there was room to question the *reality* of his power; and if the Indians are nothing more than *pigeons*, as Bobadils may think, it was a matter of very little consequence whether he kept an army of 50,000 or 500,000 of them. Besides, as removing the brigade from Elia-bas was proposed, an increase of his force might be made on a very good plea, for he then became the *barrier*, and it was necessary to prepare himself for all events; and to be ready to make a stand against any power which might move towards him, either from the north, the west, or the south.

Such was the situation of affairs when the first ships of this season arrived from Bengal, with the advices that a deputation of Mr. Cartier, General Smith, and Mr. Russell were gone up to Sujah Dowla, to insist on a reduction of his forces. Every insinuation was spread about to the prejudice of the deputation; these were indeed chiefly aimed at General Smith. Rumours of  
his



his intended march to Delhi were buzzed about ; it was said a noble Lord, eminent for his tender sensibilities, had shed tears when he saw the instructions to the Deputies, as they convinced him there was a determined resolution to force Sujah Dowla into a war ; I hope his Lordship will now shed tears of joy, to find that he was *once* mistaken in his opinion.

The Lycurgus of India was full of apprehensions for the dreadful consequences, which he was in a hurry to go and prevent, " Because the instructions of the Deputies to Sujah Dowla appeared to him so much like those given to the Deputies, who were sent to Cossim Ally, and brought on the war in 1764." \*

The Deputies found Sujah Dowla's army consisted of 48,000 *men*, which number he was not in the least inclined to reduce ; their negotiations had every prospect of ending without effect, and the Deputies found their persons were exposed to the danger of Indian politics †, and that Sujah Dowla was drawing his force together. However, at length, it being proposed to him to name the number of men which he thought necessary for his own dignity to keep up, He mentioned 35,000 ; this number the deputies, to convince him that they had no hostile intentions, agreed to acquiesce in, although they acknowledge they think it too much to entrust in the hands of the most ambitious Subah of Indostan. But as he was under no limitation before, they thought this restriction was better, than involving the Company in an immediate war.

Must not all those *great* and *little* men *blush*, who have been spitting forth their insinuations, and vomiting out their general invectives against the Company's servants abroad ? Is not this instance of *fact* a stronger proof, than all the scurrility of abuse against the servants abroad in general ? Is nothing due to those men, who have, with so much public spirit and moderation, obtained a permanent, a secure, and an honourable peace for the Company in Bengal ?

\* Mr. Scrafton (Observations on Mr. Vansittart's Narrative, p. 140) assures us, " It is past doubt, war was not the object sought for by the Council," on this occasion.

† Vide Scrafton's Observations, p. 40.

The advices read in Court observed, that the Deputies were in hopes that they should be able to effect a partition between the King and Sujah Dowla, by which the former would receive the districts of Benarras, in lieu of Corah, which would enable them to withdraw the brigade from Eliabas. A little geography is necessary to understand this matter, and I am happy to find it shews my conjectures of the motives on which the government in Bengal acted \* were not without grounds.

The dominions of Sujah Dowla lie from N. to S. and are divided by the Ganges, which runs from W. to E.

On the east his dominions are bounded by the province of Bahar, on the south by the independant Rajahs, on the west by the dominions of the King, and on the north by the Rohillas.

Eliabas is situated on the Ganges, to the westward of Benarras, near the eastern limit of the King's dominions: a garrison kept here is a check on Sujah Dowla; but if he cedes the districts of Benarras to the King, in lieu of Corah, which is the northern part of the King's dominions bordering on the Rohillas, there no longer will remain a necessity for keeping a brigade at Eliabas, because the King's dominions will unite with the province of Bahar; and thus Sujah Dowla no longer lie between us and the King, nor confine with the dominions of the Rajahs, which lie between the Ganges and the Marattoes. At the same time Sujah Dowla will become a barrier between the Rohillas and the King; and if he should attempt any military operations, it must be against the northern powers, with whom the Company are not connected, and the number to which his troops are restrained, makes it impossible for him to become so formidable, as to endanger the province of Bengal.

Before I leave this subject there is one thing absolutely necessary to be observed: It is, that Sujah Dowla expressed his apprehension that a change might *happen* in the *Government of Bengal*, and a new system of *Politicks* take place to his disadvantage, by which he would be made the dupe of his confidence in the deputies; because I think this is one of the strongest arguments

\* Letter to the Directors, p. 6.

which



which can be urged against sending any new commission to Bengal. The Company's affairs are, at present, on a good footing: There is all the room in the world to expect peace for some years under the management of the men who are at present there; and any change must strike an alarm. If the present system is a good one, why change it? If the present men, who are just returned from a public office, which, at the eminent risque of their lives they have executed so much to their own honour and to the advantage of the Company, are *fit men*, why affront them, by calling their integrity or abilities in question? I confess, if Deputies are absolutely necessary, I think those Deputies who have just discharged their trust faithfully and ably, are much more naturally pointed out for the office, than men who *may* be good; but who, it must be allowed, may be *bad*.

The advices read in-court, the moderation shewn in the Bengal Deputies, and the prospect that the Company's orders for withdrawing the brigade from Eliabas will be put in execution as soon as it can be done consistent with the interest of the Company, seem very clearly to prove that *all* the servants abroad do not think of being *umpires* of India, though they are neither such Bobadils as to think the natives are no more formidable in the field than pigeons; nor such precipitate statesmen, as to hazard the fate of India by the dash of a pen in a *spirited* paragraph.

In the late Court, the only reason given for the commission from behind the bar was, that:

“The frigate would be ready by the 15th inst. and the ministry had applied to know the Directors determination,” or something to that effect; for the letter from the ministry, which was so eagerly desired to be read by a Gentleman within the bar, was not heard by the Court.

I confess, as I always disapproved of the Commission, I was very glad to hear this so forcibly rested upon; for I thought the *absurdity* of sending an extraordinary Commission *at all*, must be generally allowed, when so trifling a matter as *the Day of a frigate's sailing* became a circumstance attended to.

The

The late advices from Bengal being of such a nature, that the grounds mentioned in the former Court \* are no longer tenable ; instead of the measure being necessary, as was then represented, from the critical situation of the war and the enormous expence, it is now insinuated, I cannot indeed say from *behind the Bar*, but by some of the Directors in private companies, that the Commission is necessary from the general spirit of licentiousness, avarice, and rapacity amongst the Company's servants. I did not, indeed, hear in the general Court any person charged by *name*, except Mr. Sykes ; but as he is now in England, it cannot, sure, be thought necessary to send a Supervisorship for that purpose. General invectives prove *nothing* ; but suppose the service to be so corrupt as now represented, it is astonishing that this should not have been the original reason given from behind the Bar for the Commission. But, on the contrary, Mr. Vanisittart professed in the former Court, that " He " knew of no intended accusations against any person ; and did " not doubt that they would execute the Commission without " any Dismissions." Many general invectives were *yelped* out by some *Proprietors* ; but the foremost of these accusers in the last Court also said, that " The Indian Troops were no better " than *pigeons* ; and that the military men, who had conquered " in India, had no more merit than if they had shot so many " *pigeons*." If this be true, the Court of Directors at home, who have approved the military establishment of about 50,000 *pigeons* at an immense expence to the Company, are at least as chargeable with *folly* as the servants abroad with *licentiousness*. When this or any other accuser condescends to produce *facts*, it will be time enough to reply.

It is said, " This Commission is a milder *mode* than *Dismissions*, as the servants abroad must otherwise be knocked down like *nine-pins*." I cannot think it *so* ; but, on the contrary, every plan which involves the innocent with the guilty, is the most *rigorous*, *impolitic*, and *tyrannical* that can be devised.—

\* Recited in the Letter to the Directors, p. 8.



The punishment of great delinquency is just, and I will venture to say, that an equal distribution of rigorous justice, free from party-principles, resentment, and precipitancy, will be attended with general satisfaction to the Company's servants.—

It has been alledged, that “The proposed Commission has been approved by his Majesty and his Ministers.”—His Majesty's name is too sacred to be mentioned on such occasions.—His Ministers are the servants of the community, and may be spoken of with freedom.—

I shall take upon me to assert, that the letter referred to from the Ministers, does not approve of the Commission as *proposed*.—For this Letter expressly says, “All retrospect to the past is improper, and that the Commission should be confined to establishing good regulations for the time to come\*.” Now I will go farther, and say that I am persuaded the Ministers know nothing of the regulations originally subsisting in the Company's service; and, therefore, must be giving sentiments on what they did not understand.—I do not, indeed, wonder *they* should very heartily approve of giving *absolute Power* to *one man*. But I own freely I do not see that they have been so very successful at home or in America, that *we* should take their advice for the management of our affairs in India, which have hitherto been managed *successfully* without them; at least, I think it would be prudent in us to wait the event of the matters at present in their hands before *we* give them any *trouble* with *India*.

I have heard it objected by a member of the *Great Assembly* to the system of the Company's Government, that *Merchants Clerks* are unfit to be the supreme legislators of a country. This objection arises from two mistakes; one in the notion entertained of the Governors; the other from a false idea of the Government.

\* I do not quote the very words; but the sense and the *expression*, as near as I can recollect.

I have, in my former Letter explained in what manner the Governors abroad are, by the constitution of the Company, provided ; I presume it must be obvious that the mode cannot be improved, and that the *education* of the Company's servants is extremely well adapted to supply the highest offices with wise and able men in due succession. This has been proved by experience, in a continued struggle through difficulties for almost twenty years, and in the present *flourishing situation* of the Company's affairs, notwithstanding the immense sums they pay to Government.

The other mistake, arising from a mis-conception of the nature of the Company's government abroad, is to be pointed out.

It is objected that " the Company's servants leave their native country without a single principle of legislation ; and therefore are unfit, not only from their *state in life*, but from *individual* circumstances, to be law-givers to the Indians."

The Company hitherto have never had the most distant view of introducing a code of laws, which should regulate the manners and minds of the Indians ; establish a new religion amongst them, and, by destroying the casts, attempt a new mode of awakening industry, and impressing motives of action. The objection would, in that case, have great weight. But when it is considered that of all the human powers, the *ability* of forming a code of laws, is *that* which has seldomest appeared, and for which Solon, Lycurgus, and Mango Capac, the Peruvian, have the veneration of all ages ; it would, perhaps be too much to expect such a *Legislator* for India, from the Inns of Court, the nomination of the Court of Directors, or even in the delegate of a British parliament.

The idea of the Company's Government does not extend to legislation. It takes up the Indians where it finds them, under a regular system of civilization, secured by casts and religious ceremonies, and leaves them perfectly free in the exercise thereof ; not assuming the power of enacting general laws,



laws, it can never promulgate the institute of destruction, by subverting the manners and customs of the Indians. And although, within the immediate limits of the Company's settlements, in all *criminal* cases, and in contests with Europeans, the Indians are subject to the English laws; yet in the former, the jury consists of an equal number of Indians and Europeans; and in the latter, which can only be simple cases of property, disentangled from all mazes of law, their ceremonies are preserved in the administration of oaths, and in every other matter wherein their customs are concerned. In all disputes amongst themselves, they are determined by the rules of their own casts, which chiefly decides by arbitration.—The Company's government has never occasion to interpose, but in flagrant acts of enormity, or in disorders, where they determine by principles of equity and political fitness, ever preserving untouched the rights of the casts which they are naturally attached to, from having viewed them as an object of veneration from early youth. The office of justice is executed by the governor and council, at the quarter sessions, in higher matters; and in small misdemeanours, as *choultry-justices*, in the execution of which office they are directed by precedent and general principles of good government. This sketch of the Company's government abroad will evince, that it is the fittest imaginable for the nature of the people over whom they have a jurisdiction; and that it cannot be so well executed as by men trained up from early age with local attachments, and entrusted with judicial authority, as a *task* annexed to that superior station to which they have attained by a regular progression of good behaviour for a series of many years.—I am far from insinuating the Company's servants can do no wrong.—They are *men*—but not *worse* than *other men*.

No one in the least acquainted with the disposition of the Indians, whose manners and religion are established by customs, handed down from time immemorial, a single breach in the fundamentals whereof, cuts off the individual from the society for ever, can entertain a doubt, that the first innovation in their

customs, which the smallest oversight of an act of parliament or code of laws may point at, would give the *general alarm*, which would spread universally, till we were left the Lords of a desolated waste, instead of continuing sharers in the revenue of Bengal. The only advantages to be derived from India, whether in the channel of commerce or revenue, must entirely arise from the number of industrious inhabitants; as soon as the country is extirpated of these industrious subjects, there is an end to revenue and to commerce.

Some allege the instance of the Mogul government in confirmation of their position, "that India may be governed by "foreign rulers." But in this a partial apprehension of the subject leads to a false conclusion.

If the nature of the Mogul government be considered as relative to the Indians, it will be very far from appearing in the same odious colours that it does, in the conduct of the Moguls amongst themselves.

Whatever might be the case, in the first inroads of the barbarous Tartars, the Moguls who conquered India, ever since they effected that conquest, notwithstanding the zeal of mahometanism against idolatry, giving up all idea of making converts to their faith, left the natives in the unmolested possession of their religion and manners; thus every officer having from his infancy, these sentiments of toleration instilled into him, none but madmen could ever think of attempting innovations, or were guilty of impertinent indiscretions.

In considering the Mogul government we must distinguish two periods. When the officers in the provinces, were really officers of the Mogul, appointed by the court, and on all occasions responsible to it.—And when, by feuds at the capital, civil discords, and foreign invasions, the provincial officers became in *fact* independent, though *nominally* dependent on the throne.

When the authority of the Mogul extended to the utmost limit of his extensive empire, the jurisdiction of the provinces was delegated to officers of different natures and denominations;

*subordinate*



*subordinate* to, though *independent* of each other; and all immediately appointed from the throne.

On the Carnatick the Nabob of Arcot, subordinate in a certain degree to the Subah of the Decan, had in his province, a *Duan* for the collection of the revenue; and several Killedars who were Governors of the many forts in this open country. In the northern provinces on the Coromandel coast, and in the higher parts of the empire, where there are few forts, the Rajahs stood in place of the Killedars, to maintain the dependence of the Nabobs; these Rajahs being very powerful, were always a sufficient restraint to prevent any precipitate revolt; at the same time that the Nabob, by sowing dissentions amongst them, prevented any confederacy that might have been formidable to his province.

It is obvious a government thus disposed, so long as it maintained a vigour at the capital, could not be shaken by revolt: But, after the Persian invasion had shewn the weakness of the throne, the Subahs of the provinces aimed at independence.

Whilst the provinces were under subjection, any attempt upon the Indians would have brought down the severest punishment on the officer, who dared to weaken or destroy the great pillar of the Mogul's *authority* in the independence of the Indians, and of his *revenue* in their industry and commerce.

When a Viceroy aimed at independence, with a view to his interest, he secured the Indians from molestation, as this was the means of enriching the country, and ultimately himself, by the riches flowing into the revenue, whereby he was secured by wealth from any feeble attempts which the throne could have made; and he was protected by the affections of the people, against the machinations of the ambitious in the province, who, by violence, might have endeavoured to supplant him.—Oppressions were scarce extended farther than to a few *rich men*, who are seldom in any country the objects of much compassionate attention, or to those who were suspected to be rivals for authority. The Indians remained at ease and unmo-

lest, unless when the Morattoes invaded the country; then desolation and destruction were spread every-where.

The Mogul's living so very much apart from the Indians, so far as regards the manners of the people, they were in a manner under their own Government; and it does not appear any attempt was made to introduce a change in their laws, after Ekbar informed himself of the religion and casts of the Gentoos.

Laws are only good as they are fit for the people who receive them; and the knowledge of this fitness can only be acquired by feeling grievances and inconveniencies *immediately* as an *individual*, or *indirectly* by observation of the *effects*, and from conversation of those who do. From this principle, an *Englishman* is the fittest to enact laws for *Englishmen*: He knows their wants, and he feels their grievances. But *he* is unfit to form laws for the *Indians*. *He* can never conceive that *eating a piece of beef* can be a sufficient reason for driving a man from the society as a monster of impurity!

But even, could it be admitted that a code of laws, or plan of regulations for the government in India, could be sent from England, is it possible that all the lawyers in England, the Directors, and all whose opinions they may condescend to ask, can digest such a *plan* in *fifteen* days?

"No, (it is replied) not perfectly: But the Supervisors may go with *part*, and instructions and further opinions be sent "after them\*." It is then proposed that the Supervisors shall go with a crude indigested plan, which it may be found necessary to contradict by the first ship sent after them; and the *second* thing they have to do, be to reverse the *first* they had done: I think this is entirely in the *spirit* of the Commission.

A rumour is spread about, that Mr. Verelst continues in the Government, and that Mr. Cartier therefore comes home. I hope this is no better founded than the *intended march* to Delhi; for I confess, although I have a very great

\* Sir G. Colebrooke made this reply to me.



confidence in many of the men who are in the administration of Bengal, I shall be sorry whenever the Company lose the service of a man, whose behaviour has been such, that through all the disputes, and all the revolutions in Bengal, he has maintained without impeachment or insinuation from any party, the character of a man of ability, honour, and integrity.

Either this report is, or is not true? Mr. Cartier *is*, or he *is not* expected home this year: If he *is*, can there be a greater absurdity than to send Commissioners to inspect into the state of the affairs of India, when such a man as all parties allow Mr. Cartier to be, is shortly expected in England? For, is it not obvious that this man can give all the information the Company can wish for, free from any suspicion of party-rage, which Mr. Vansittart has declared he ever avoided when the spirit of faction was at the highest; and that his opposition was like a man who, however he might differ in opinion, always preserved the behaviour of a gentleman.

On the other hand, if Mr. Cartier is not coming home this year, will not a Supervisorthip bring him home? He only remains from that laudable ambition which every good man in the Company's service must feel, of rising to his own honour, and to the advantage of the Company, the highest station to which any man can rise in their service. Do not the private letters from Bengal say, that Mr. Cartier has in view to correct all the abuses which are felt in Bengal from Lord Clive's mistakes? And what can the Commission proposed effect, but the removal of the Governor who is universally allowed to have the ability and virtue, and has already taken the resolution, to correct the abuses as soon as it is in his power?

I must plead for the indulgence of the Proprietors to these observations; the shortness of the time does not permit me to urge all the objections which may be made to this crude, indigested, or sinister plan, or to place the objections which I have mentioned in the strongest light: all the just objections could not be made

made in a much longer time than some men have allotted for digesting a code of laws.

What advantages can attend precipitancy? A ship sailing in July, departs at the most unfavourable season of the year. The calms near the line are of greater extent in the months of July, August, September, and October, than at any other time, extending at that season to the 13th and 14th degree of latitude; whereas, in the other months of the year, these calms seldom exceed the 6th degree \*.

Ships sailing at the proper season are seldom less than three months to the Cape of Good Hope. The northerly winds set in to the eastward of the Cape on the south of the line in October, and continue till April, as the N. E. winds do in N. latitude: so that a ship sailing in July, has calms and contrary winds the whole passage to India. The ship intended to carry the Commissioners is just launched, and has never been at sea; new ships are always unhealthy, and sickness must ever retard a passage. I will venture to engage, that a ship sailing in November will arrive in less than a month after the Aurora sailing by the latter end of July, notwithstanding her copper bottom. By November all the ships from India will be arrived, and the code of regulations may be canvassed. Delay then for the present a measure which may do much injury, but cannot be attended with any success by precipitation.

If the Ministry refuse to keep the frigate till November, by that time the Commissioners, if they must go, may be supplied with one of Mr. Moore's machines, which would make the whole of a piece.

Think for yourselves; consider the fate of the Company depends on your ballot; and that you have been told this Commission is warmly approved by those ministers who refused to *prolong your charter*, at a time when they took 400,000*l. per annum* from you.

\* Vide Dapré's Mem. sur le Navig. aux Indes, p 5. Beckman's Voyage to Borneo; Lord Clive's, or any other Voyage made at this season.

Should



Should this Commission at any time hereafter be found necessary, the consideration may be resumed ; but if you confirm the appointment at present, the Commissioners will be hurried away, and no time left you to reflect on the ruinous consequences which may ensue.

I suspect some men have in view to *betray* the Company, by drawing them in to take the government of Bengal into their *own* hands : and then there will be a plea for depriving the Company of the whole.—The Commissioners will return when a new bargain is to be made ; and the Proprietors may then find themselves left with 6 per cent. dividend, and the tail of an expiring charter.

There are no lottery tickets in India, nor contracts under government ; the servants of the Company depend upon the Company alone : the Commissioners *must* be paid. It is allowed the Commission will cost *some hundred thousand* Pounds. Have the Ministry agreed to bear a share of the expence ? Or, is the whole to come out of the pockets of the Proprietors ?

The time will not allow me to say more.

I am

An Old and Faithful Servant,

July 10th,  
1769,

And True Friend to the Company,

ALEXANDER DALRYMPLE.





## P O S T S C R I P T.

**T**HE following account of the deputation to Sujah Dowla cannot fail of giving as much satisfaction to the public, as it does honour to General Smith; such reasons are sufficient apology for producing a private letter.

“ We have had a meeting with Sujah Dowla; he requested us, whilst on our journey, to name the place: we proposed Elia-bas \*. This was by no means agreeable to him; therefore, under a pretence of shewing the extent of his attachment, confidence, and complaisance, he wrote us word, that he would attend a meeting on the frontier of his own dominions; and accordingly moved with speed toward Benarras. It was fortunate that I had previously ordered captain Smith, with a batallion of seapoys, to meet the deputation at that place, otherwise we should have been without any other escort, than two troops of Mogul cavalry. We arrived at Benarras the 17th, and his Excellency came the next day. Mutual visits of ceremony having passed, about the 20th we began upon business. We had a most arduous task to accomplish; it was to persuade the most ambitious man in all Indostan, to restrain his growing military power, and put a final check to his increasing strength. He fought all our arguments manfully, and whenever we had the superiority, he immediately retreated to his strong-hold, by having recourse to the original treaty, where no limitation was expressed. This negligence, or bad policy of Lord Clive's

\* The names are differently spelt; I have made them conformable to what before used, without meaning by that to insinuate that they are here wrong.

had well nigh involved the Company into a dangerous and expensive war. We could oppose no other arguments to this truth, but that of self-preservation ; and you must suppose that to be a very delicate point to handle, as it avowed suspicion. Twice we broke up abruptly—the Nabob and the Deputies little pleased with each other. A private conference betwixt his Excellency and me, the next day, held by the request of my brother Deputies, brought things into a better train : but yet he was afterwards so difficult to manage, that at length we were under the necessity of informing him, we should set off to Eliabas, without delay and represent all affairs to his Majesty ; which was, in fact, only a genteel mode of telling him we would break up the conference : but this was neither our wish nor intention ; and it produced all the effect we hoped or expected, as it made the vizier \* much more tractable. After a variety of arguments, and many declarations of mutual good-will, an additional article to the treaty was concluded on, signed, sealed, and sworn to respectively, by which he is bound down never to increase his forces beyond a certain number. Before I mention this number, it is highly expedient that you should be informed, that he had in his service 48,000 men, not of the rabble, of which the Indostan armies were and are usually composed ; but many very excellent battallions of seapoys. Although we did not wish to see him rise up to such a degree of power, as might render him dangerous to his neighbours, and, perhaps, to his best benefactors ; yet we did not desire to wound his honour, but to let him retain a force amply sufficient for the protection of his country, and such as would make him appear amongst the first Omrah's of Indostan. Indeed I will frankly confess, that the number of his forces exceeded those representations which I had repeatedly made of his growing power ; and we having so long delayed this necessary restriction, he now felt his own consequence, and we were now obliged to grant him much more than he would have thought

\* Sujah Dowla is vizier to the Mogul, as well as Nabob of Owde.



of asking twelve months before. To deal ingenuously and frankly with him, we wished him to mention what number of forces he thought necessary for his service, always remembering that the English were his steady friends: it was a long time before we could bring him to any fixed point; the very idea of a restriction was so disagreeable. At last he mentioned, that if we intended to consult his honour, he could not maintain less than 35,000 men; if we endeavoured to reduce him below that number, *he was helpless, and must submit*. We determined to give him the very number he required; but we resolved to prescribe the nature and establishment of those troops. Here again was another grand object of contest. We would allow him to maintain as many horse as he chose out of the number already settled—he is grown wise, and wishes only for infantry; and his seapoys are scarce inferior to our own in all points, but that of European officers. We mentioned 13,000 horse, 7000 seapoys, a favourite regiment of his, called the *Nudjeb Phultan*, consisting of 5 bodies, each body 1000 men, armed with match locks and bayonets: 500 men for his artillery service; and the remainder of the 35,000 to be irregulars, never to be armed after the European manner, nor clothed, nor embodied. After much disputation we were obliged to reduce the number of horse 3000, and add 3000 to his seapoys; for with this force we considered, that he alone could never pretend to cope against us. Now that we have bound him down by treaty not to increase his army beyond this number, it ought to be our care to watch his conduct. We esteemed it a great point gained to fix this line, since he was without limitation. But should he, in some future time, attempt to increase his army beyond the line above-mentioned, we shall have then a just ground for calling him to account; which, at present, had there been a necessity for so doing, we could plead no other excuse than self-preservation; and although that is one of the first principles of action, yet our measures might have been liable to censure in England, where men reason upon very little knowledge, and where prejudices so very much prevail, that I suppose we should have

been esteemed amongst the Nabob-makers of the age. Certain it is that we have taken these precautions but just in time, another years preparations would have made him formidable beyond controul.

“ You will, perhaps, be pleased with the last article, wherein we have bound down our successors, as far as our public faith being plighted can bind them.

“ In my private conference he represented to me, that even should he agree to the terms now required, from the nature of our government, he had no certainty of what might happen hereafter; for when we were embarked for Europe, the next administration might be desirous of concluding other new articles.

“ There was something solid in this objection; and I therefore assured him if he consented, and adhered to the terms now proposed, that we would readily sign any articles, that should make him perfectly easy on that head, so long as he remained steady to his own engagements. This had great sway with him; and I am persuaded will be acceptable to the Court of Directors, as it effectually shuts the door to any future administration entering into cavil, or dispute unless absolute necessity requires it: in short, avarice and ambition are here powerfully curbed, and it must be some very notorious fact that can warrant a deviation from that to which we have subscribed.

“ He signed the treaty with a good grace, and declared to me, that as we had formerly exchanged turband and hat, in token of brotherhood, so, on the whole of this negociation, I had acted towards him as a brother: that the English chiefs had consulted his honour in the arrangement they had thought necessary to make; and after having heard so many reports of what was to be done, he was happy to find all matters were so amicably adjusted. “ If (says he) you have found me defending “ every point, with all the arguments I could urge, you must “ not suppose it argues an unfavourable appearance; you must “ believe that I am determined religiously to abide by this new “ article of the treaty, and, therefore, I was desirous of making “ the



“ the best terms in my power. Had not my intention been thus determined, I might have complied without hesitation to all your demands, and when I got home to my own capital, I should have acted as I pleased.” Specious enough you will say. I am, however, highly pleased with the conclusion of this negociation, as I think it bids fair to preserve peace for some time to our Bengal possessions.

“ It is not material to point out to you the many difficulties that occurred in the course of this congress; but knowing the man with whom we were negotiating, the deputies were not without some personal apprehensions, for if Sujah Dowla had been inclined to a refractory system, he might have made a glorious stroke. So great, that it was scarce sound policy, to suffer such a tempting bait to come into his brain. He might have surprised the three Deputies, including the commander in chief; the second in command was with us. Sujah’s mortal enemy, Munur-ul-Dowlah, was also at Benarras, as was that sly, rich old fox, Bulwan Sing Zemindar, of Benarras, and worth 2 corore of rupees: 300 Europeans were on the river in boats, and would have been in danger; and 8 lacks of rupees, that was on the road to Eliabas, was an additional temptation. Besides, he might have destroyed a batallion of seapoys, which was with us, and the batallion which was stationed with him. In short, whilst affairs were dubious, and we knew not what turn matters would take, we were really in a disagreeable situation. He had brought to Benarras only a batallion of seapoys and 1500 horse; but we had advice of 3 batallions and 2000 horse, which he had left near Juanpoor; and if the chap had been inclined to treachery, these troops might have reached Benarras in a forced march. I ordered another batallion of seapoys to join us from Eliabas with all expedition, under the pretext of escorting treasure, and accompanying the European detachment: but neither the batallion nor detachment arrived with us, until the points were settled, and harmony and good humour prevailing.”

This

This letter speaks for itself, and makes it entirely unnecessary to say any thing of General Smith's character; that of Mr. Cartier is so well established, that it requires nothing to confirm it; and Mr. Scrafton has declared, that " Mr. Russell appears to " be a man of very superior abilities." We are apt to be partial to the understanding of our friends, I shall not, therefore, pretend to confirm Mr. Scrafton's opinion; but I must say I shall acknowledge myself much deceived, if the Company do not find Mr. Russell to be a man of as much worth and honour as any in their service. I fancy nobody will think the Bengal Deputation would be tarnished by a comparison with those intended to be sent from England as superintendants over them. Mr. Vanfittart has often publicly declared, that the Company have many servants of distinguished ability at Bengal; and I must say the example of a Governor of so much virtue as Mr. Cartier is acknowledged to be, will introduce order and regularity, if these are really wanting, which Mr. Vanfittart would not allow on Lord Clive's representation.

**F I N I S**